Paul-Henri Spaak, as preserved in the names of many streets & buildings... Not convinced by the "equal stature" or "coalition of the defeated" characterisations, or that Friedman is unaware of the history, or that his aspirations for future unity depend on a replication of the historic conditions of one particular union. But commonality of interests would help, of course
Paul-Henri Spaak, as preserved in the names of many streets & buildings... Not convinced by the "equal stature" or "coalition of the defeated" characterisations, or that Friedman is unaware of the history, or that his aspirations for future unity depend on a replication of the historic conditions of one particular union. But commonality of interests would help, of course
I meant “coalition of the defeated” to be provocative. But consider. Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1959, two years after the six signed the Treaty of Rome. If he had been in office when this treaty was negotiated it’s conceivable that all of the “supranational” aspects would have been rejected. De Gaulle wanted a strong European alliance led by France, including a military component (that might have become a rival to NATO). There was nothing implausible about this vision, it lost out because the Treaty of Rome created various path dependencies which influence Europe still. Maybe Friedman does know this history, but that would make him unusual, even among Americans with an Atlanticist mindset.
But after thinking about this more, I think you’re right that the usefulness of the analogy doesn’t require any exact replication of circumstances. If it was the case that elites throughout the Middle East were at wits end, and so they were willing to throw the dice on some untried concepts, drawing upon the Abraham Accords, Oslo, and Camp David for inspiration, that would be analogous. The original impetus was to make peace with enemies and work with them. There is no Franco-German antagonism today.
Paul-Henri Spaak, as preserved in the names of many streets & buildings... Not convinced by the "equal stature" or "coalition of the defeated" characterisations, or that Friedman is unaware of the history, or that his aspirations for future unity depend on a replication of the historic conditions of one particular union. But commonality of interests would help, of course
I meant “coalition of the defeated” to be provocative. But consider. Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1959, two years after the six signed the Treaty of Rome. If he had been in office when this treaty was negotiated it’s conceivable that all of the “supranational” aspects would have been rejected. De Gaulle wanted a strong European alliance led by France, including a military component (that might have become a rival to NATO). There was nothing implausible about this vision, it lost out because the Treaty of Rome created various path dependencies which influence Europe still. Maybe Friedman does know this history, but that would make him unusual, even among Americans with an Atlanticist mindset.
But after thinking about this more, I think you’re right that the usefulness of the analogy doesn’t require any exact replication of circumstances. If it was the case that elites throughout the Middle East were at wits end, and so they were willing to throw the dice on some untried concepts, drawing upon the Abraham Accords, Oslo, and Camp David for inspiration, that would be analogous. The original impetus was to make peace with enemies and work with them. There is no Franco-German antagonism today.