Listen now | 0:00 Tom’s Pulitzer-Prize hat trick 1:03 Why Beijing is relatively calm about Trump’s reelection 9:33 China hawkism in the AI community 15:24 What’s Trump’s logic re Greenland and Panama? 22:44 On Israel-Palestine, is a two-state solution still possible? 31:06 How a stable ceasefire in Gaza could transform Israeli politics 36:17 Why Trump may be better than Biden on Israel-Palestine 43:46 Bob and Tom debate a possible strike on Iran 52:42 Prospects for peace in Ukraine under Trump 55:24 How America is making a Chinese invasion of Taiwan more likelyRobert Wright (Nonzero, The Evolution of God, Why Buddhism Is True) and Thomas Friedman (The New York Times). Recorded January 21, 2025.Twitter: https://twitter.com/NonzeroPods
I always get a lot out of Bob's chats with Friedman. Thanks to Bob and company for this.
It was especially refreshing to see the conversation cover some areas of disagreement. I often have a different opinion from Bob on foreign affairs topics, so it's nice to hear a guest doing just a bit more pushback than the typical guest.
I know people make fun of the "taxi driver" stories, or in this case intern at the airport stories, but imo Friedman has a unique gift for distilling complicated things happening in the world into understandable stories and anecdotes that do a decent job helping us better understand the world.
I always enjoy it when Friedman is a guest, and I learn a lot. But I seriously wonder whether he knows much about the early history of the European Union. It’s a challenging subject, because it’s shrouded in self-flattering narratives and bureaucratic tedium. I studied this for a few years, in the US and in Europe. It’s been around for more than 70 years, and I’m not sure there is a great book on its history in English still. But I’ll suggest a few insights about which I’m confident. First, the original six was a coalition of the badly defeated. they didn’t come together for idealistic reasons, this was a Hail Mary pass. And if even one of the original members had more stature than the others it might have never come to pass. But second, these were all countries which had been through the Industrial Revolution, were on a similar level economically, and had some sense of shared cultural patrimony. This is the first I’ve heard Friedman speak of his belief that the EU might serve as some sort of template for the Middle East. Color me skeptical. But I appreciated Friedman’s insights. Maybe he should make the EU the topic of his next book! There is a great untold story here waiting to be mined, and the timing is right for someone to tell it.
I don't think Germany / West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have ever all had anything approaching equal stature, on any metric
At the end of WW2 they did, sort of. Germany was the most powerful but had been the instigator. France had this rich culture but had seemingly shown itself unable to defend itself. Italy was where fascism was birthed, though it had switched sides. Belgium is an interesting case, because it's status was enhanced by Paul-Henri Speak, the foreign minister, and senior statesman of Europe. But he also devised the policy whereby Belgium left the alliance it had with France, hoping not to be drawn into the war. The Netherlands was relatively unblemished by WW2, morally, but small. Only Luxembourg, I'd agree, was a tag along, but it provided this extremely useful circumstance of equivalence. Its vote was equal to Germany's. Playing the role of Rhode Island among the original thirteen states. But the original treaties of what became the EU were negotiated by diplomats who knew and respected each other. And no one country was dominant, owing to the peculiar circumstances of WW2. Out of space, but "coalition of the defeated" is a decent description, imo, with the US and UK being the victors, and everyone knew it.
Paul-Henri Spaak, as preserved in the names of many streets & buildings... Not convinced by the "equal stature" or "coalition of the defeated" characterisations, or that Friedman is unaware of the history, or that his aspirations for future unity depend on a replication of the historic conditions of one particular union. But commonality of interests would help, of course
I meant “coalition of the defeated” to be provocative. But consider. Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1959, two years after the six signed the Treaty of Rome. If he had been in office when this treaty was negotiated it’s conceivable that all of the “supranational” aspects would have been rejected. De Gaulle wanted a strong European alliance led by France, including a military component (that might have become a rival to NATO). There was nothing implausible about this vision, it lost out because the Treaty of Rome created various path dependencies which influence Europe still. Maybe Friedman does know this history, but that would make him unusual, even among Americans with an Atlanticist mindset.
But after thinking about this more, I think you’re right that the usefulness of the analogy doesn’t require any exact replication of circumstances. If it was the case that elites throughout the Middle East were at wits end, and so they were willing to throw the dice on some untried concepts, drawing upon the Abraham Accords, Oslo, and Camp David for inspiration, that would be analogous. The original impetus was to make peace with enemies and work with them. There is no Franco-German antagonism today.
Significant upshot of Biden's prohibition of advanced chips to China pulled the legs out from under chip and AI stocks in the U.S. today. China has developed a new AI model that is as powerful as those using the most advanced chips but with less advanced chips it makes domestically and with less energy usage. Add another unintended consequence to Biden's move. Good for climate and consumers, bad for U.S. tech, at least in the short term. This just strengthens Bob's point that the move against China is self-defeating and increases the risk of an invasion of Taiwan.
I always get a lot out of Bob's chats with Friedman. Thanks to Bob and company for this.
It was especially refreshing to see the conversation cover some areas of disagreement. I often have a different opinion from Bob on foreign affairs topics, so it's nice to hear a guest doing just a bit more pushback than the typical guest.
I know people make fun of the "taxi driver" stories, or in this case intern at the airport stories, but imo Friedman has a unique gift for distilling complicated things happening in the world into understandable stories and anecdotes that do a decent job helping us better understand the world.
Great episode. I really enjoyed it. I'm actually going to browse the transcript, which isn't something I usually do.
I always enjoy it when Friedman is a guest, and I learn a lot. But I seriously wonder whether he knows much about the early history of the European Union. It’s a challenging subject, because it’s shrouded in self-flattering narratives and bureaucratic tedium. I studied this for a few years, in the US and in Europe. It’s been around for more than 70 years, and I’m not sure there is a great book on its history in English still. But I’ll suggest a few insights about which I’m confident. First, the original six was a coalition of the badly defeated. they didn’t come together for idealistic reasons, this was a Hail Mary pass. And if even one of the original members had more stature than the others it might have never come to pass. But second, these were all countries which had been through the Industrial Revolution, were on a similar level economically, and had some sense of shared cultural patrimony. This is the first I’ve heard Friedman speak of his belief that the EU might serve as some sort of template for the Middle East. Color me skeptical. But I appreciated Friedman’s insights. Maybe he should make the EU the topic of his next book! There is a great untold story here waiting to be mined, and the timing is right for someone to tell it.
I don't think Germany / West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have ever all had anything approaching equal stature, on any metric
At the end of WW2 they did, sort of. Germany was the most powerful but had been the instigator. France had this rich culture but had seemingly shown itself unable to defend itself. Italy was where fascism was birthed, though it had switched sides. Belgium is an interesting case, because it's status was enhanced by Paul-Henri Speak, the foreign minister, and senior statesman of Europe. But he also devised the policy whereby Belgium left the alliance it had with France, hoping not to be drawn into the war. The Netherlands was relatively unblemished by WW2, morally, but small. Only Luxembourg, I'd agree, was a tag along, but it provided this extremely useful circumstance of equivalence. Its vote was equal to Germany's. Playing the role of Rhode Island among the original thirteen states. But the original treaties of what became the EU were negotiated by diplomats who knew and respected each other. And no one country was dominant, owing to the peculiar circumstances of WW2. Out of space, but "coalition of the defeated" is a decent description, imo, with the US and UK being the victors, and everyone knew it.
Paul-Henri Spaak, as preserved in the names of many streets & buildings... Not convinced by the "equal stature" or "coalition of the defeated" characterisations, or that Friedman is unaware of the history, or that his aspirations for future unity depend on a replication of the historic conditions of one particular union. But commonality of interests would help, of course
I meant “coalition of the defeated” to be provocative. But consider. Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1959, two years after the six signed the Treaty of Rome. If he had been in office when this treaty was negotiated it’s conceivable that all of the “supranational” aspects would have been rejected. De Gaulle wanted a strong European alliance led by France, including a military component (that might have become a rival to NATO). There was nothing implausible about this vision, it lost out because the Treaty of Rome created various path dependencies which influence Europe still. Maybe Friedman does know this history, but that would make him unusual, even among Americans with an Atlanticist mindset.
But after thinking about this more, I think you’re right that the usefulness of the analogy doesn’t require any exact replication of circumstances. If it was the case that elites throughout the Middle East were at wits end, and so they were willing to throw the dice on some untried concepts, drawing upon the Abraham Accords, Oslo, and Camp David for inspiration, that would be analogous. The original impetus was to make peace with enemies and work with them. There is no Franco-German antagonism today.
Significant upshot of Biden's prohibition of advanced chips to China pulled the legs out from under chip and AI stocks in the U.S. today. China has developed a new AI model that is as powerful as those using the most advanced chips but with less advanced chips it makes domestically and with less energy usage. Add another unintended consequence to Biden's move. Good for climate and consumers, bad for U.S. tech, at least in the short term. This just strengthens Bob's point that the move against China is self-defeating and increases the risk of an invasion of Taiwan.
I'm starting to wonder if it is possible within the realm of physical reality for someone to be more narcissistic than Thomas Friedman.
Nonsense